06 August 2007
After-thought (Preface)
2 thoughts
On Nietzsche:
1. It's a typical misunderstanding of the naïve to suppose that Nietzsche's main polemic was directed against philosophers. Nietzsche could care less for philosophers and the history of their "tradition" - a testament to his honesty and "realism," to the fact that his investigations were held in the absolute vicinity of (his) life and its pulsating movements. But this does not change the fact that Nietzsche himself was "philosophizing," a term to which he then obviously wanted to give a new meaning. Sure, he had something to say about (or against) philosophy, but this polemic is only an off-shoot of his main concern with morality as the slanderer of life. Morality, as he encounters it, is the name for the existential problem facing contemporary existence. If Nietzsche were writing during the time of Ancient Greeks, he would have still philosophized, but with a slightly different spirit, perhaps with much more joy and innocence than he could afford during his actual time (the meaning of "untimely meditations"). Religion and philosophy are subjected to hammering in his works only insofar as they naïvely subscribe to moral evaluations. This hammering is an off-shoot in the same sense in which "consciousness" itself is something of an off-shoot, a late and a relatively imperfect development in the progression of instincts. Nietzsche's writings delve into the very profound, yet changing, quandaries of existence - a testament to his so-called "existentialism" - irrespective of whether "philosophy" - previous or contemporary - affirmed or denied existence. This is the meaning of Nietzsche's a-historicism, the very endlessness of his polemical works - he would have produced his works even if there existed no philosophy before him, which is not what one can say regarding a Kant or a Hegel, who are so much dependent about a certain tradition of thought. Tardy "scholars" who take what Nietzsche says to be a version of "relativism", "nihilism" "naturalism" or dismiss him because he is being "self-contradictory" are confused about themselves. Nietzsche's writings, in one sense, exhibit all these tendencies, but they also exceed these latter. His writings thus breathe the air of life. They exist...!
2. Another proof of Nietzsche's a-historicism - the lack of technical language in his writings. But he does not just present a common, everyday language without making this language undergo real, life-like mutations and variations. When these writings are recast in a technical mould, as if this recasting does not change the nature of what is said, (which is another naïvety of philosophy scholars), then what emerges is an isolated philosopher, who has nothing to do with life, who thinks he has attained the right to abstract from the latter, preserving the purity of his philosophy from all "ontic" considerations. How a change in style of writing results in a different philosopher! A blot, to be more precise! This philosopher we call by the name - Heidegger. Heidegger - as a result of a profound confusion about Nietzsche's writings, about the importance of how Nietzsche said what he said.
31 July 2007
United Colors

19 July 2007
To the naive and the sentimental
For instance, Kant did not "refute" Hume's skepticism; he was no more "truthful" than Hume, but at bottom one reads Kant more than Hume because Kant has come to capture the spirit and the mood of the generations that followed him (a mood of a certain serious gloominess tempered by cautious restraint, I might say!). Or as I say I find Kant more "tasteful" (in sentimental scholarly circles, more "profound") than Hume. But I also read Nietzsche more than Kant, although Nietzsche in many ways is more playful, more joyous, and hence more closer to Hume than to Kant.
To give an example of how enormous and uncharted this field of underlying confusion can be: One of the mostly-unconscious issues with respect to which most of these philosophers wrestle with is whether or not there should be a distinction between (their) "life" and (their) "philosophy" or between "reality" and "thought"; and if there is a distinction, how can the line between the two be unambiguously drawn. This question plagues many of these thinkers (Wittgenstein), and if it does not directly plague their own thinking process, it will play a sleight of hand in determining how their successors interpret them (ex: how the early-modern writers like Leibniz, Descartes, Spinoza appear archaic and irrelevant to OUR post-modern life). Wittgenstein, who was more aware of this particular issue than many, sought in his earlier work to clearly differentiate between "life" and "philosophy," and by doing so, sought to completely eliminate the latter. However the bunny popped up again, like a shadow which kept following him until he decided to be a philosopher again! (But if there is no distinction between the two, how would thought (philosophy) get its material, its "phenomena"?) Nietzsche was not so naive. He sought to entangle philosophy and life in endless crisscross ways, constantly denying any clear distinction between them. In fact, his whole polemic can be read as against those philosophies which sought (unconsciously) to rise above the sphere of life (which presupposes a clear distinction between the two), to transcend, comprehend and comment on the latter. Nietzsche found a place for philosophy within life, and for life within philosophy. Heidegger, his interpreter, unhappily does not see the struggle of Nietzsche's polemic. He brings his own set of assumptions, unawares, into his study of Nietzsche, and like most others his assumptions too (more than any others') tries to find a unique place for thought in spite of reality. Hence he reads Nietzsche's so-called "perspectivism" and "phenomenalism" as aspects of a subjectivist line of thought to which Nietzsche belongs with the likes of Descartes. What do we get? One more instance of confusion. Now, all of these three writers are "right" in their own ways, given their presuppositions. But to clarify these latter one needs another polemic. And so on.